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ABSTRACT
How is the current condition of religious free exercise, and religious
accommodation in specific, best understood? What is the relationship of
the two most important free exercise cases of the past half-century,
Employment Division v. Smith and Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC? This essay explores four possible answers
to these questions.
1. Smith and Hosanna-Tabor are the twin suns of religious accommodation
under the Constitution. They are distinctively powerful approaches.
2. Hosanna-Tabor’s approach to constitutional free exercise is now more
powerful than Smith’s. Smith has been eclipsed.
3. Hosanna-Tabor has shown itself to be feeble. It has been eclipsed by Smith.
4. Smith augured the waning of religious accommodation, which proceeds
apace. Hosanna-Tabor does little to change that.
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In describing these possibilities, the essay considers the cases themselves,
various doctrinal developments—focusing on subsequent Supreme Court
cases as well as lower court decisions interpreting Hosanna-Tabor—and
the broader political and social context in which claims for religious
accommodation are now received. It concludes that though each possibility
has persuasive points—perhaps with the exception of the second—the last
is most accurate.
Smith’s approach to free exercise continues to control for constitutional
purposes and is, for more general political purposes, more entrenched than
ever. Its admonition about fabulously remote threats of anarchy in a world
where each “conscience is a law unto itself” has ironically become more
apt as a warning against the multiplying number of secular interests
argued to be legally cognizable than against religious accommodation run
amok. There is no clearer manifestation of these developments than the
recent emergence of theories maintaining that new dignitary and other
third party harms resulting from religious accommodation ought to defeat
religious freedom claims. These theories reflect the swollen ambit of state
authority and defend surprising understandings of the limits of religious
accommodation—understandings that pose grave threats to the American
political tradition of providing generous religious exemptions from general
laws. The ministerial exception simply represents the refracted glow of
constitutional protection in the gathering gloom. It is free exercise by
moonlight.
INTRODUCTION
It is the evening of religious accommodation. Religious exemptions
from general laws, if not yet abominated outright, are more controversial
and divisive than at any time in modern memory. The agitated rancor that
continues to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. might obscure that it has been twenty-five years since
the Court last defined the scope and limits of the Free Exercise Clause.1
That largely undisturbed decision—Employment Division v. Smith2—held
that exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws on the basis
of religious conscience are never constitutionally required, no matter how
1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Paul Benjamin
Linton, Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses Under State Constitutions, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 107 (2013).
2. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 107 Stat. 1488. Three years later,
the Court clarified its approach to free exercise but the basic doctrinal terms in which
religious accommodation is evaluated did not change. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).

106

DEGIROLAMI (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 53: 105, 2016]

9/14/2018 2:41 PM

Free Exercise By Moonlight
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

grave the burden to the religious individual or group, and no matter how
insignificant the state’s interest in enforcing the law.
Some scholars have debated Smith’s holding as a matter of constitutional
history3 and doctrinal development.4 Others have pointed out that in practice,
and as applied by lower courts, Smith’s rule and rhetoric sometimes sound
more absolute than they actually are.5 But there was more motivating the
Smith Court than interpretive or doctrinal fidelity. A particular political
psychology underlies Smith: a stubborn optimism about the American
people’s capacity to reach charitable, generous, and sensible religious
accommodations without the safety net of judicial review,6 a genuine trust
in democratic wisdom and accountability.7 “Just as a society that believes
in the negative protection accorded to the press by the First Amendment
is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the
printed word,” wrote Justice Scalia, almost in exhortation, “so also a
society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief
can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.”8 The
passage with broad political support of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, its state analogues, and by then with less support, the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,9 followed by decisions in a handful
3. Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 947 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1153 (1990);
Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence
from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1119–20 (2008).
4. See 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE
AND FAIRNESS 68–85 (2006); Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards
of Federalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1815, 1817 (2011); Douglas Laycock, Summary and
Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841, 853 (1992).
5. Nelson Tebbe, Smith in Theory and Practice, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2055, 2056–
57 (2011); see MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 147–66
(2013).
6. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
7. Cf. Letter from James Madison to Congress (June 8, 1789), in 2 THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 49, 50 (Neil H. Cogan ed.,
2d ed. 2015) (“In our government it is, perhaps, less necessary to guard against the abuse
in the executive department than any other; because it is not the stronger branch of the
system, but the weaker: It therefore must be levelled against the legislative, for it is the
most powerful, and most likely to be abused, because it is under the least controul [sic] . . . .”).
8. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
9. Already by 2000, and in light of the failure of the Religious Liberty Protection
Act in 1999, the political conditions had changed from 1993. See James M. Oleske, Jr.,
The Born-Again Champion of Conscience, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 89 (2015) (reviewing
ROBERT P. GEORGE, CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES: CONFRONTING THE DOGMAS OF LIBERAL
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of cases, seemed at first blush to validate the Court’s confidence. But that
appraisal may have been shortsighted and too quick—the serendipity of a
small sampling of cases in which the religious claimants were perceived
not to threaten other more essential, secular ideological and political aims,
sexual equalities and autonomies of various kinds foremost among them.
The price of religious accommodation has been cheap enough to bear.10
But beards are not birth control,11 and in little more than two decades since
the passage of these laws, popular support for religious accommodation,
though still strong, is weakening.12 The low esteem of academics is far
more palpable.13 Many of these laws likely would not pass today, and

SECULARISM (2013)), http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/vol_
128_Oleske.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VDR-V4TY].
10. Statutory claims for religious accommodation by isolated, socially and politically
powerless individuals (prisoners and members of tiny, exotic cults) have won the unanimous
approbation of the Supreme Court. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015); Gonzales
v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006); Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, which protects
the religious exercise of institutionalized persons, qualifies as a permissible accommodation
that is not barred by the Establishment Clause). This is, of course, to the Court’s credit.
But the absence of conflict with any significant secular political interests (particularly
interests implicating sexual equality and autonomy) in these cases renders it difficult to
evaluate the depth of the Court’s commitment to religious accommodation.
11. See, for example, the House and Senate bills proposing to render Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) categorically inapplicable to religious objections to the
paid provision of birth control. S. 2578, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. 5051, 113th Cong.
(2014). To my knowledge, no congressional bill was introduced in response to the Court’s
decision in Holt v. Hobbs.
12. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154,
155 (2014) (“Once a fairly ‘uncontested’ issue that remained in the ‘background of public
attention,’ religious accommodation has become a ‘contested’ issue occupying the forefront
of public debate. The change has been sudden, remarkable, and unsettling.”); Do You
Want a Religious Freedom Law in Your State?, RASMUSSEN REP. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://
www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/march_2015/do_yo
u_want_a_religious_freedom_law_in_your_state [https://perma.cc/R4YK-WKR9].
13. Several legal academics regularly and enthusiastically oppose the efforts of states
to craft RFRAs with precisely the same scope of the earlier statutes. Letter from Ira C. Lupu
et al., to Nathan Deal, Governor of Ga. (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.georgiaunites.org/wp
content/uploads/2015/01/Georgia-Religious-Freedom-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J8E-J7MH]
(opposing draft of H.B. 29).
Examples of hostility to religious accommodation in the academic literature are legion.
See, e.g., Professor Elizabeth Sepper’s perhaps ironically titled, Reports of Accommodation’s
Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 24, 24–27 (2014).
I have argued that the consensus has long been against granting religious exemptions
from generally applicable laws to commercial entities and to for-profit corporations
in particular. Instead, our consensus favors equal citizenship of individuals and, as a result,
limited rights for powerful commercial actors. . . .
....
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certainly not with the kind of overwhelming bipartisan backing they had
in the past. Though their repeal is not yet imminent, the repeal or significant
alteration of ordinary law—even of a “putative super-statute”14—is always
a real possibility when it loses the approval of popular majorities.
The accommodation-unfriendly posture of Smith has become less an
expression of judicial restraint in the service of democratic self-governance,
and more a blunt political ambition in the service of equality as the master
value of our time.15
Lost in all the statutory hubbub is the additional concern that the Free
Exercise Clause has fallen into desuetude. There have been very few
Supreme Court cases after Smith involving the constitutional free exercise
of religion. Even these have been either mere elaborations of Smith16 or
cases in which the Free Exercise Clause played the role of superfluous
extra in an Establishment Clause, free speech, or expressive association
movie.17 The vanishing of constitutional free exercise does not necessarily
. . . We understand that whereas individuals (and perhaps churches) occupy one end of
the religious-accommodation spectrum, commercial businesses—for-profit, secular corporations
in particular—stand at the other.
Id. Professor Sepper’s assurances that individuals “and perhaps churches” still do enjoy
some rights of religious accommodation notwithstanding, her suggestion that “our consensus”
elevates secular egalitarian ideals over religious accommodation on all other occasions of
conflict does represent the views of an increasingly clamorous academic body.
14. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1230 (2001); Horwitz, supra note 12, at 166 (raising the possibility that RFRA is a “superstatute”).
15. See Steven D. Smith, Equality, Religion, and Nihilism 1–2 (Univ. of San Diego
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 14-169, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2516400 [https://perma.cc/28GM-ERQW]. Moreover, any argument
that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) violates principles
of federalism has been largely abandoned. Concerns about federalism were not to be seen
in Holt v. Hobbs. See Holt, 135 S. Ct. 853. Yet, is it so implausible to imagine that future,
religion-unfriendly federal legislators might pass a law commanding states not to accommodate
any religious claims in prison or land use disputes short of violating the Free Exercise
Clause? Thanks to Bruce Ledewitz for provoking this thought.
16. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding that a state’s intentional
exclusion of devotional degrees from a scholarship fund available to all other degree programs
did not represent the sort of “discrimination” or “animus” toward religion prohibited by
the Free Exercise Clause under Smith); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (offering an exposition of the nature of general laws and the
targeting of specific religions for unfavorable treatment).
17. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669 (2010); Watchtower
Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168 (2002); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 868 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Because the First Amendment
also bars any prohibition of individual free exercise of religion, and because religious
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mean that religious accommodation is moribund.18 Nobody would say
that voting rights are in danger because they are generally enforced
through the Voting Rights Act rather than the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments. But constitutional protection for religious accommodation
gave to religious freedom something of security and permanence: the
security of an additional stratum of evaluation in the judiciary;19 and the
permanence that attends laws that cannot be changed by the whims
of popular majorities.20
In 2012, however, perhaps something changed. The ailing body of
constitutional free exercise may have been revived that year by HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,21 in which the
Supreme Court found that a “ministerial exception” to federal antidiscrimination laws foreclosed a claim of retaliation by an ordained
teacher at a Lutheran elementary school.22 That exception, the Court held
unanimously, was grounded in the Constitution and represented a limitation
on state power to interfere with the autonomy of religious institutions.
Though the Court’s ruling was narrow, acknowledging the existence of the
ministerial exception and finding it applicable to the particular facts in the
case, and to nothing more,23 it is possible that Hosanna-Tabor represents a

organizations cannot be isolated from the basic government functions that create the civil
environment, it is as much necessary as it is difficult to draw lines between forbidden aid
and lawful benefit.”).
18. There have been some constitutional free exercise developments in the lower
courts. See generally Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise:
Smith, Lukumi, and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850
(2001). One fairly recent case decided by the Montana Supreme Court presented a
plausible challenge to the meaning of general applicability, but the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. See Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t Labor & Indus., 2012 MT 320, 291
P.3d 1231, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 59 (2013).
19. True, constitutional security for religious accommodation does not necessarily
guarantee favorable outcomes for religious claimants, as the period prior to 1990 demonstrates.
But a regime in which judicial review remains a possibility at least provides an opportunity,
even when unfulfilled, for a set of legal actors to correct any grievous errors that the people
might make as to accommodations.
20. As will become plain, this critique of Smith is not at all intended as an argument
for reversing it at this point. Under present socio-cultural conditions, it is probable that Smith’s
reversal now would have at best a marginal impact on claims for religious accommodation.
21. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
22. Id. at 710.
23. See id.
The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a
minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. Today we hold only
that the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether
the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging
breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.
Id.
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new phase in the doctrinal and socio-cultural development24 of constitutional
free exercise. In the fours years since its decision, perhaps Hosanna-Tabor
has even begun to destabilize the parsimonious Smith rule for religious
accommodations.
How, indeed, is the current condition of religious free exercise, and
religious accommodation in specific, best understood? What is the
relationship of Smith and Hosanna-Tabor? Both because of HosannaTabor’s youth and the perpetually changing quality of doctrine, there are
no definitive answers to these questions. But this essay explores four
possibilities in the sections that follow:
1. Smith and Hosanna-Tabor are the twin suns of religious accommodation
under the Constitution. They are distinctively powerful approaches.
2. Hosanna-Tabor’s approach to constitutional free exercise is now more
powerful than Smith’s. Smith has been eclipsed.
3. Hosanna-Tabor has shown itself to be feeble. It has been eclipsed by Smith.
4. Smith augured the waning of religious accommodation, which proceeds
apace. Hosanna-Tabor does little to change that.

These are not the only possibilities, but they do span a relatively wide
range of responses to the question of the current state of religious free
exercise under the Constitution. In describing and evaluating these
possibilities, the essay considers the principal cases themselves, various
doctrinal developments—focusing on subsequent Supreme Court cases as
well as lower court decisions interpreting Hosanna-Tabor—and the broader
political and social context in which claims for religious accommodation
are now received. It concludes that though each possibility has persuasive
points—perhaps with the exception of the second—the last is most accurate.
Smith’s approach to free exercise continues to control for constitutional
purposes and is, for more general political purposes, more entrenched than
ever. Its admonition about fabulously remote threats of anarchy25 in a
world where each “conscience is a law unto itself”26 has ironically become
more apt as a warning against the expanding number of secular interests
argued to be legally cognizable than against religious accommodation run
amok. There is no clearer manifestation of these developments than the

24. New as a matter of fairly recent American legal history. The roots of the ministerial
exception extend back, as the Supreme Court noted, many hundreds of years. See id. at
702; see also Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 821, 828–31 (2012) (presenting the historical roots of the ministerial exception).
25. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
26. Id. at 890.
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recent emergence of theories maintaining that new dignitary and other
harms to third parties resulting from religious accommodation ought to
defeat religious freedom claims. These theories reflect the swollen ambit
of state authority and defend surprising understandings of the limits of
religious accommodation—understandings that pose grave threats to the
American political tradition of providing generous religious exemptions
from general laws. The ministerial exception simply represents the refracted
glow of constitutional protection in the gathering gloom. It is free exercise
by moonlight.
I. TWIN SUNS
The Constitution never requires religious accommodations from neutral
laws of general application.27 And yet the government may not encroach
on the autonomy of religious institutions, such as religious schools, by
imposing its nondiscrimination laws on them when it comes to the selection
and retention of ministers.28 To the extent that religious institutions are
thereby being exempted from compliance with generally applicable
nondiscrimination laws, it does seem that these two approaches to religious
accommodation exist in mutual tension. Is the tension illusory?
One way to resolve it—with ambiguous support from the Court’s
opinion—is to describe Hosanna-Tabor as exclusively an Establishment
Clause case, or the Free Exercise Clause feature of it as unnecessary or
superfluous. Indeed, as Professor Michael Helfand has shown, several
courts before Hosanna-Tabor had relied heavily, if not solely, on the
Establishment Clause to ground the ministerial exception.29 The Supreme
Court was equivocal about which religion clause was its root. At several
points in the opinion, the Court indicates that both Clauses are independently
sufficient bases for the ministerial exception.30 At other points, the opinion

27. Id. at 881.
28. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
29. Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration,
97 MINN. L. REV. 1891, 1915–18 (2013).
30. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702, 706.
The First Amendment provides, in part, that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
We have said that these two Clauses “often exert conflicting pressures,” . . . and
that there can be “internal tension . . . between the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause,” . . . . Not so here. Both Religion Clauses bar the government
from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.
....
. . . By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise
Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission
through its appointments. According the state the power to determine which
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suggests that an amalgam of both Clauses grounds it. In its statement of
the issue, for example, the Court asked “whether the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment” protected the plaintiff
church.31 Both this way of putting the question presented and the Court’s
subsequent discussion of the historical function of the Clauses—“[t]he
Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers,
and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom
of religious groups to select their own”—might imply that both Clauses
were working in tandem.32 The case for the necessity of the Free Exercise
Clause is also strengthened by the Court’s heavy reliance on its church
autonomy line of cases, in which free exercise justifications often figure
prominently.33
It is certainly proper to describe the ministerial exception as grounded
independently in the Establishment Clause. Yet whether necessary or
sufficient, the Free Exercise Clause does represent a primary constitutional
basis for the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor. Without the free
exercise component, an important feature of the ministerial exception—
the freedom of religious institutions as independent rights-holders to select
their spiritual leaders, quite apart from entanglement concerns—disappears.
Many subsequent cases interpreting Hosanna-Tabor have either noted
that the ministerial exception is rooted in both Clauses34 or have raised
only the Free Exercise Clause.35 The strategy of describing the ministerial

individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause,
which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,
719 (2005); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971)).
31. Id. at 699 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 699, 703.
33. E.g., id. at 704–05 (“[T]he Court recognized that the ‘[f]reedom to select the
clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven,’ is ‘part of the free exercise of
religion’ protected by the First Amendment against government interference.” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church
in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952))).
34. See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 172–73 (5th
Cir. 2012); Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668, 672 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
35. See, e.g., Doe v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1225,
1229 (E.D. Wash. 2013); Winbery v. La. Coll., 2013-339, p. 9 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13);
124 So. 3d 1212, 1218.
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exception as exclusively an Establishment Clause doctrine is therefore
unpersuasive.36
Another way in which the tension between the two cases might be reconciled
is to distinguish the type of religious accommodation at issue in each of
them. If persuasively disaggregated, each approach to accommodation
might continue to operate independently powerfully in its respective sphere
of influence. The Supreme Court opted for this strategy in Hosanna-Tabor:
It is true that the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation, like Oregon’s prohibition on
peyote use, is a valid and neutral law of general applicability. But a church’s
selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote. Smith
involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. The present case,
in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church decision
that affects the faith and mission of the church itself. The contention that Smith
forecloses recognition of a ministerial exception rooted in the Religion Clauses
has no merit.37

On this reading, Hosanna-Tabor, like Smith, is a case about religious
accommodation from a neutral and generally applicable law, but the
distinctions drawn by the Court between Smith and Hosanna-Tabor have
come in for some heated criticism.38 Not entirely without reason. The
“outward physical acts” justification does not make much sense: hiring
and firing a church employee is just as physical or “outward” an act as
ingesting peyote.39 And ingesting peyote—or other “physical acts” of
individuals—might under certain circumstances constitute an “internal
church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself”: for
example, it might be the doctrinally prescribed method by which prospective
members of the religion, or ministers themselves, are initiated.

36. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 824 (“Looking solely at Supreme Court precedent,
however, the Establishment Clause would appear to be an unlikely avenue for upholding
a religious exemption from the antidiscrimination laws.”). Supreme Court precedent aside,
however, the concept of disestablishment does seem germane to the issue of government
regulation of, for example, clergy selection.
37. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 (“The government may not . . . lend its power
to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.” (quoting Emp’t
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990))).
38. Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951, 954–57 (2012); Leslie C. Griffin,
The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 992–95 (2013); Mark Strasser, Making the
Anomalous Even More Anomalous: On Hosanna-Tabor, the Ministerial Exception, and
the Constitution, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 400, 444–45 (2013). See also McConnell,
supra note 24, at 835.
39. The decision in Smith used the “physical acts” language merely to distinguish the
type of religious free exercise that would only protect belief and profession. Smith, 494 U.S.
at 877 (“the ‘exercise of religion’ [protects] not only belief and profession but the performance
of (or abstention from) physical acts . . . . [E]ngaged in for religious reasons . . . .”).
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In an elegant article, Professor Christopher Lund develops a more
persuasive account of the distinctive sorts of religious exemption in the
two cases based on the principles of “implied consent” and “insider/
outsider” status.40 Lund argues that the key difference rests on the type of
party bringing the claim as either a member of the religious institution
who has at least by implication consented to its rules or a non-member
who has not:
Consent binds those who consent. And it binds those who bring derivative claims.
Consent here being of a constitutional nature, it bars the government from acting
on behalf of those who consent. But it does not bar outsiders to the church, and
it does not bar the government from acting on behalf of those outsiders.41

The ministerial exception is thus triggered by a kind of self-imposed
exemption on the part of the employee from the potential benefit of general
laws, in the way that assumption of risk might operate in tort law.42 Or,
in Lund’s vivid metaphor, when two participants consent to fight, they
cannot later sue one another in tort for battery.43 The theory of implied
consent can reconcile, Lund believes, the Smith and Hosanna-Tabor rules.
It can sustain the twin suns of free exercise.
Theories of implied consent have found other able defenders in recent
law and religion controversies. Professor Michael Helfand, for example,
articulates a similar view to justify a religious institution’s authority to
deny the cost-free provision of contraceptive coverage to its employees in
the face of a neutral, generally applicable law requiring its provision:
[I]nstead of excluding institutions that provide services to non-members or to
corporations that turn a profit, courts should demand that institutions be granted
an exemption from the contraception mandate so long as the facts and circumstances
surrounding the employment environment provide sufficient reason to presume
that employees understood the unique religious aims of their employer. In such
circumstances, employees should be presumed to have impliedly consent[ed] to
the authority of the religious institution to make rules and resolve disputes that
promote unique religious objectives such as faith and salvation.44

40. Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of
Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183 (2014).
41. Id. at 1194.
42. See id. at 1200.
43. Id. at 1194 n.67.
44. Michael A. Helfand, What Is a “Church”?: Implied Consent and the Contraception
Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 401, 411 (2013) [hereinafter Helfand, Implied
Consent]; see also Helfand, supra note 29, at 1915, 1923.
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Both Lund and Helfand locate the constitutional root of their respective
approaches in Watson v. Jones,45 a Reconstruction-era property dispute
between the main body of the Presbyterian Church in the United States
and a dissenting body within it. Both claim that the shift of focus from
the nature of the employer to the obligations assumed by or consensually
imposed upon the employee is a theoretical advance.46 And both are
motivated by a deeply voluntarist conception of religious authority and
religious freedom. As Helfand puts it: “At their core, religious institutions
derive their authority from the consent of their members.”47
Interesting as these implied consent theories are, they present several
problems that raise doubts about their stability, and by extension about the
strength of Hosanna-Tabor by comparison with Smith. The first problem
concerns the revocability of consent. One central assumption in their
accounts is that consent must be irrevocable in the situations they discuss:
once the employee consents (impliedly) to the religious authority of the
institution, that (implied) consent cannot later be withdrawn.48 If it could,
then the institution’s exemption—ministerial or otherwise—would cease
to apply at the time the employee began to dissent. At that point, the
government could move ahead on behalf of the dissenting employee, who
now enjoyed “outsider” status. The ministerial exception or the institution’s
ability to resist the force of neutral and generally applicable laws ought to
be ineffectual at that point. Implied consent ought therefore to be essentially
irrevocable consent in the ministerial exception context.
And yet Helfand has argued that implied consent is revocable: “[w]here
the relationship between the individual and the community has been
severed, there can no longer be a claim of implied consent and therefore
no claim of church autonomy.”49 Quite apart from the complexities of
ascertaining withdrawal of implied consent, however, this resolution
greatly compromises and weakens the reach of the ministerial exception.
The effect of consent’s withdrawal varies across legal disciplines. In
some areas, such as criminal and tort law, even express consent may be

45. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
46. Helfand, Implied Consent, supra note 44, at 410. Lund is more qualified, but
he does take a voluntarist view of religious affiliation and commitment. See Lund, supra
note 40, at 1203 (“An important aspect of church autonomy is how every insider has the
right to leave, the right to become an outsider. Maybe this is part of the church autonomy
principle itself; maybe it describes the limits of church autonomy.”).
47. Helfand, Implied Consent, supra note 44, at 417.
48. Thanks to Bill Galston for putting the strongest version of the non-revocability
position to me.
49. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote, supra note 29, at 1939–40 (citing Douglas Laycock,
Towards a General Theory of Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and
the Right to Autonomy, COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1406 (1981)).
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withdrawn.50 To recur to Lund’s intentional tort metaphor, though two
parties may consent to fight each other, consent is generally revocable,
and the effective revocation of either party may result in the liability of
the other.51 Yet in other areas, such as contract law—seemingly a better
analogue for the types of relationships implicating the ministerial exception—
consent to the contract is not generally revocable, at least not without the
payment of damages for breach.52
Second, the theories’ voluntarist foundation assumes a contested model
of church authority that in some, and perhaps many, cases may not apply.
If religious institutions derive their authority from their individual members’
consent, then the withdrawal of that consent should deprive the institutions
of that same authority, at least as to the withdrawing individual. An
exclusive focus on the voluntarist quality of religious association weakens
the overall case for institutional exemption and exacerbates the thorny
inquiry—acknowledged by Lund—concerning insider or outsider status:
everything depends on that distinction alone.53 Implied consent theories

50. This is certainly true in the law of rape, increasingly including post-penetration
withdrawal of consent. See In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 186 (Cal. 2003) (quoting CAL.
PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2) (West 2003)); see also Lund, supra note 40, at 1202–03 (“But if
the principle is that people should get to do what they want behind closed doors without
government interference, adult men and women cannot sue each other for injuries arising
out of sexual acts to which they both freely consented . . . . The same is true for religion.”).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(5) (AM. LAW. INST. 1979)
(“Upon termination of consent its effectiveness is terminated, except as it may have
become irrevocable by contract or otherwise, or except as its terms may include, expressly
or by implication, a privilege to continue to act.”).
It is possible that the ministerial exception creates a “privilege to continue to act” on the
part of the religious institution by implication even after the withdrawal of implied consent
by the employee. But there are several difficulties even here. The comment on section 5
gives the example of situations in which no notice has been given of withdrawal of consent
or where the other party requires time to withdraw himself, as in the withdrawal of consent
to be on private property before liability for trespass. None of these examples contemplates
an indefinite privilege of one party to continue to behave as if consent had never been
revoked by the other party. More importantly, the very basis of these theories of implied
consent is the individual, voluntaristic basis of religious authority. As discussed below,
that view sits rather uneasily with the position that consent may never be revoked.
52. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235(2) cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) (“Non-performance of a duty when performance is due is a breach whether
the duty is imposed by a promise stated in the agreement or by a term supplied by the
court . . . .”).
53. Lund, supra note 40, at 1195 (“It will be difficult to tell when exactly the
government acts on behalf of insiders and when it acts on behalf of outsiders.”).
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depend upon certain language in Watson v. Jones,54 and it is true that some
of the church autonomy decisions rest on the idea that members of religious
institutions voluntarily join them and are therefore bound to accept
institutional decisions to which they might otherwise object. Yet it should
not be overlooked that the principal function of the religious entity at issue
in Watson, whose governing body was elected by the congregation, was
to represent the wishes of the congregation.55 Watson is thus particularly
amenable to the sort of voluntarist theology of religious authority favored
by implied consent theorists.56
But this does not mean that religious institutions whose authority is not
derived from the elective preferences of individual members, or from the
representational function that they perform—there are several that fit this
bill—enjoy no ministerial exception or are disabled from resisting government
mandates. That is, the implied consent of individual church congregants
is not a precondition of the church’s capacity to invoke the ministerial
exception or to lodge a statutory objection to government mandates that
violate its religious commitments. And the state need not adopt a theology
of implied consent with respect to religious institutional authority to maintain
a ministerial exception. Take the case of excommunication, a decision by
a religious institution to expel, shun, or censure a member who may still
consent to the church’s authority. After excommunication, the member’s
implied, or even express, consent to the church’s authority no longer binds
that member to the institution; yet the institution may nevertheless invoke
the ministerial exception in response to legal claims by the excommunicated
party—assuming ministerial standing. And cases after Watson have
emphasized the authority of religious institutions, qua institutions, freely to
settle on doctrine, select leaders and clerical hierarchs, or resist objectionable
government mandates, without depending on a theory of implied consent
as to church membership and authority.57 In one of the most recent, the

54. See Watson v. Jones , 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871) (“All who unite
themselves to such a [religious] body do so with an implied consent to this government,
and are bound to submit to it.”).
55. Id. at 681–82 (stating that both the “Church Session” and the Church trustees
were elected by the congregation they represented).
56. See Helfand, supra note 29, at 1933–34 (describing members of religious institutions
as “grant[ing]” them authority).
57. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (“[C]ivil courts [must] defer
to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical
church organization.” (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
724–25 (1976); then comparing Watson, 80 U.S. at 733–34)).
[W]here resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil
courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that
civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a
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Sixth Circuit held that the ministerial exception “is a structural limitation
imposed on the government by the Religion Clauses, one that can never
be waived.”58 That holding sits uncomfortably with the view that the
authority of religious institutions is founded exclusively on the consent of
individual members.
Third, what counts as “implied consent”—and its revocation—is not clear.
This is less a question about the boundaries of insider or outsider status59
than a puzzle about what Lund describes as the “fiction” of implied consent.
Consent is a multipurpose concept that cuts across many different legal
disciplines: it is a doctrine that “does many things,”60 and it would be helpful
to know precisely what it is doing here. At the beginning of his classic
critique of the concept of consent in modern liberal states, Professor Don
Herzog asks several questions about consent about which it would be
useful to hear more from implied consent theorists laboring in the
religious exemption vineyards:
When do we need to consent? Should there be special ceremonies of initiation?
Or does consent need to be constantly renewed? Do we need to find affirmative
acts? Or is the failure to dissent enough? Where—in what social spaces—should
we require consent? . . .
Just what does consenting bind us to? . . . Can the people revoke their trust?
Or are they stuck? What if ten years ago, I took a vow of poverty for the rest of
my life, a vow I now regret: can I shrug and forget about it? . . . What if others

church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their
application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them.
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709 (citing Md. & Va. Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 369–70 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(1970)); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344
U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (noting a “spirit of freedom for religious organizations”).
See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). Hobby
Lobby was, of course, not about a church, but there is nothing in the Court’s decision which
limits the capacity of the religious organization to resist the government’s contraception
mandate solely predicated on a finding that the employees impliedly consented to being
bound by the organization’s religious convictions—though such implied consent might and
probably should be a relevant factor in the RFRA compelling interest analysis.
58. Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829, 836 (6th Cir.
2015).
59. Lund discusses these boundary questions thoroughly. See Lund, supra note 40,
at 1188, 1203–04.
60. See Samuel L. Bray, On Doctrines That Do Many Things, 18 GREEN BAG 2d 141
(2015).
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have altered their plans in light of my vow and expect that I will continue to
uphold it?61

Such questions are more pressing for theories of implied consent than for
consent proper, because theories of implied consent are less precise about
the contours of consent.62 In what sense, for example, do female employees
of a business organization with a religious mission consent by implication
to their employer’s capacity to resist a mandate requiring the cost-free
provision of contraceptive products to them that was not yet in existence
when they became employees? Assuming that such precise consent is not
needed, at what level of abstraction does implied consent operate, and
how deeply are courts permitted to inquire to ascertain its existence? And
if implied consent truly is a “fiction,” might we instead be better off
arguing about the merits of the religious exemption at issue than “going
through the circumlocutions of hypothetical consent”?63
The point of this extended aside on implied consent as a basis for the
ministerial exception and accommodations more broadly is certainly not
to debunk it, as there are many persuasive features of the theory. Theological
voluntarism does represent an important part of the backdrop of religious
freedom in America, and it can justify at least some of what ought to occur
in ministerial exception cases.64 We do not demand that people go to
church; they are free to go if they wish, and not to go if they do not. But
it is one thing to say that people consent to join religious institutions, and
another to say that they consent to decisions made by those religious
institutions once they have joined.65 An institution, as Herzog puts it, is
something like “a Pandora’s box, though not ordinarily one with invisible
or unknown contents, of policies and practices. If you choose to open the
box, does it follow that you’ve chosen each and every one of its contents?”66
At any rate, questions about the contours and limits of implied consent,
and particularly about its claim that religious institutions derive their
61. DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 3 (1989).
62. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269,
312 (1986) (“The enforcement of informal commitments where evidence of legally binding
intentions is more obscure, however, has plagued contract law for centuries. In such
agreements courts must infer assent to be legally bound from the circumstances or
“considerations” or “causa” that induced the parties’ actions.”).
63. HERZOG, supra note 61, at 4.
64. I have argued that a religious institution’s compliance with its own stated
procedures ought to be a factor in determining the application of the ministerial exception.
See DEGIROLAMI, supra note 5, at 183–87. That limitation might be justified in part on
the basis that prospective employees of the religious organization can thereby ascertain
the rules that obtain before agreeing to join it.
65. See HERZOG, supra note 61, at 231 (“Dan can choose to enter a monastery, but
once there his actions will be dictated by its hallowed rules.”).
66. Id.
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authority solely based on the consent of the individuals who choose to join
them—and are deprived of authority whenever such individuals leave
them—suggest that at least in contested cases there may be some slippage
toward the firmer and more ordinary case of religious exemption subject
to the Smith approach. Smith will continue to predominate.
Another reconciling strategy might be that cases like Hosanna-Tabor
concerning the ministerial exception actually are not about religious
accommodation at all since an accommodation assumes the existence of
a general power of the state to govern within the particular sphere at issue,
but instead represent a jurisdictional line of demarcation. Professor Gregory
Kalscheur, for example, has argued that the ministerial exception is a
jurisdictional acknowledgment of the “penultimacy of the state.”67 Likewise,
Professor Rick Garnett and John Robinson argue that the ministerial
exception is best understood as a doctrine of the limits of “jurisdictional
competence” of the civil authority to decide religious questions.68 All of
these readings emphasize the disestablishmentarian features of the ministerial
exception—the ways in which the ministerial exception represents a kind of
revivified separation of church and state.69 For Garnett, the ministerial
exception is better justified as a manifestation of the separation of powers
or a federalism of civil and ecclesial authority than as a case of
accommodation: “‘the fears of power and the hopes for freedom’ that have
long animated and shaped our constitutional experiment require careful,

67. Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause:
Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the
Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43, 91 (2008) (citing Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm
a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After Boerne, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861,
867, 923 (2000); then comparing Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the
Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41, 77 (2003)); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institutions and
Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 122–23 (2009) (discussing the ministerial
exception as a doctrine of “adjudicative disability”).
68. Richard W. Garnett & John M. Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor, Religious Freedom,
and the Constitutional Structure, 2011–2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307, 328–39.
69. See also Alan Hurst, Hosanna-Tabor and the Exaggerated Decline of Separationism,
1, 4, 44 (Mar. 7, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2230022 [https://perma.cc/XUA3-584W] (“[Scholars] have perceived the
Court’s turn from separationism to be more complete and more dramatic than has actually
been the case.”).
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vigilant attention to the distinction, division, and separation among
authorities.”70
At least on one reading, however, the Hosanna-Tabor Court seemingly
cast doubt on the jurisdictional interpretation of the ministerial exception
in a well-remarked footnote: “We conclude that the exception operates as
an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional
bar. That is because the issue presented by the exception is ‘whether the
allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,’ not whether ‘[t]he
court has power to hear the case.”71 It is certainly possible to interpret this
footnote as merely distinguishing between a court’s obligation to dismiss
a case as exceeding its subject matter jurisdiction and its obligation to
dismiss it for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Yet
the “fact-intensive status”72 of the ministerial exception after Hosanna-Tabor
is another indication that the Court thinks it more properly characterized as a
species of accommodation—in which interest-balancing is often the rule—
than as an Establishment Clause creature—in which interest-balancing is
typically forbidden.73 And if the ministerial exception is indeed an “exception,”
it seems natural to suppose that it is “excepted”—or exempted—from
a neutral, generally applicable law.
A final possibility is simply not to reconcile the cases: to acknowledge
the tension between them, and to concede that the contexts in which they
apply overlap, yet nevertheless to maintain that each remains as powerful
as the other. They are simply rival approaches, neither of which has yet
proved the stronger and neither of which is likely to be rejected. Perhaps
70. Richard W. Garnett, “Things That are Not Caesar’s”: The Story of Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 171, 171–74 (2011) (Richard W.
Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2011) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 590 (1952)).
71. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
709 n.4 (2012) (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010)). For
further discussion of this footnote, see Helfand, supra note 29, at 1919 (“Indeed, footnote
four could not be squared with the view that courts lack the competence to resolve religious
disputes.”); Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction,
and the Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289 (2012).
72. Lund, supra note 40, at 1191; see also DEGIROLAMI, supra note 5, at 178–86
(discussing the particularist quality of the ministerial exception inquiry). It is true that
jurisdictional arguments still may be made as part of the balancing calculus and that, as
Garnett and Robinson say, footnote four seems only to reject a kind of “decisional”
incompetence in the courts. Garnett & Robinson, supra note 68, at 328–29. But HosannaTabor’s footnote four significantly weakened a strong jurisdictional reading emphasizing
the separate sovereignties of church and state.
73. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Limits of Equal Liberty as a
Theory of Religious Freedom, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (2007) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER
L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION
(2007)). For similar observations, see Lund, supra note 40, at 1189 (recognizing that
Hosanna-Tabor reflects an interest-balancing approach).
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we will muddle along with both for a time. There are areas of law that
stumble about blindly in this way, with multiple ill-conceived tests applied
simultaneously in increasingly unpredictable and confounding ways.74
But not forever. Hosanna-Tabor may augur doctrinal changes for the Free
Exercise Clause, but if it does, at some point fairly quickly these will run
up against the Smith rule. When they do, there may be some jurisprudential
settling, but we are unlikely to remain for long with equally influential,
yet distinct, approaches to free exercise applicable to the same subject matter.
II. SMITH IN ECLIPSE
A second possibility is that in the few years since its decision, HosannaTabor’s scope has become significantly greater, so much so that it is
positioned to eclipse Smith as the dominant approach to religious
accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause. Though it is true that
Hosanna-Tabor has been extended by some lower courts—and also true
that some lower courts were moving in Hosanna-Tabor’s direction even
before the decision—this is the least persuasive characterization of the
four.
There are a few bits of evidence in its favor, however. Hosanna-Tabor
does seem at certain points to separate the religious freedom of institutions
from the religious freedom of individuals and treat them as distinct matters.75
It talks of the Court’s “special solicitude” for the rights of religious
organizations, without remarking on any similar solicitude for individuals.76
The Seventh Circuit has characterized Hosanna-Tabor as concerning “the
autonomy of the church,”77 and one rarely hears about “the autonomy of
the individual” from the Court in its discussion of religious freedom—
though one does in other contexts. These judicial statements do seem
unequivocally to reject the view that institutional religious freedom is
merely derivative of or parasitic on individual religious freedom, as well
as the even more extreme position that institutional religious autonomy is

74. The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence comes leaping to
mind. For criticism, see Marc O. DeGirolami, Bloating the Constitution: Equality and the
U.S. Establishment Clause, in THE SOCIAL EQUALITY OF RELIGION OR BELIEF (Alan Carling ed.,
2016).
75. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
76. Id. at 706.
77. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 677 (7th Cir. 2013).
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an outright fallacy.78 If this distinction finds doctrinal traction —and is
considerably amplified—it conceivably might threaten Smith, as more
claimants might find ways to couch their legal claims in institutional
rather than individual terms.79
Smith, moreover, was a 5-4 decision, while Hosanna-Tabor was
unanimous.80 To the extent that either is in danger of eclipse, the Court’s
voting pattern might suggest greater staying power in the latter. The Supreme
Court in Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure has achieved either unanimity or
a 5-4 split—largely tracking ideological division—in every law and religion
decision it has considered.81 There was nothing particularly controversial
or contentious for any member of the Court about Hosanna-Tabor; indeed,
the Hosanna-Tabor concurrences argued for even broader ministerial
exception coverage than discussed by the majority. That unity of purpose
and perspective was not at all present in Smith at the time it was decided.
Furthermore, a few cases arguably have extended Hosanna-Tabor
somewhat beyond its narrow scope. A recent case, for example, held that

78. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law?: The Constitutionality of the
Ministerial Exception from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1988–89
(2007) (calling institutional religious freedom a “secondary right”); Marci A. Hamilton,
The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse and
Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225 (2007). The circumstances in which
church autonomy might be breached are, of course, to be distinguished from the question
whether the doctrine exists at all.
79. See, e.g., State v. Crank, 468 S.W.3d 15, 27 (Tenn. 2015) (holding that
Tennessee’s statutory “spiritual treatment exemption” to the state’s child abuse and neglect
laws applies not to individual religious believers but only “to members of religious bodies
which, like the Church of Christian Science, are established institutions with doctrines or
customs that authorize healers within the church to perform spiritual treatment via prayer
in lieu of medical care”). Of course, Crank is a state statutory decision dependent on
findings of legislative intent and has no constitutional application.
The success of this strategy may depend in part on the future of institutional religion in
the United States more broadly. At the moment, other contrary developments—such as
the rise of the “nones” as a religious legal category—seem more prominent. See Mark L.
Movsesian, Defining Religion in American Law: Psychic Sophie and the Rise of the Nones
1 (European Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. RSCAS 2014/19, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399470 [https://perma.cc/E62Q-HSM4].
80. See Lund, supra note 40, at 1193 (describing Hosanna-Tabor, not Smith, as the
“fixed star” of free exercise).
81. For discussion of the significance of the Roberts Court’s voting patterns in this
area, see Marc O. DeGirolami, Constitutional Contraction: Religion and the Roberts
Court, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 385 (2015). Professor Ronald Collins has noted a similar
voting pattern in the Roberts Court’s speech cases. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional
Freedom—the Roberts Court, the First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L.
REV. 409 (2012–2013); see, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (2012) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“I write separately to note that . . . the Religion Clauses require civil courts
to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious organization’s good-faith
understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”).
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a religious organization that is neither a church nor affiliated with a church
may nevertheless be a religious institution for purposes of the ministerial
exception, and that the ministerial exception is not waivable by a religious
institution.82 Massachusetts’ state high court has extended ministerial
exception coverage in the case of a non-ordained employee who taught
religion at a Jewish school.83 Several other cases have held that tort and
contract claims of various kinds fall within the ambit of the ministerial
exception.84 And, as Professor Lund has shown, some courts had already
been moving in Hosanna-Tabor’s direction, or beyond it, before the Court
rendered its decision.85
Yet to describe Smith as at all overshadowed, let alone eclipsed, by these
developments would be unpersuasive. While Smith was a 5-4 decision in
1990, the Supreme Court has shown itself to be fully committed to the
Smith rule. No member of the Hobby Lobby Court, for example, was inclined
to raise the possibility that the federal government’s contraception mandate
was not a rule of general application and therefore merited strict scrutiny
even under Smith, even though that issue had been raised by some of the
parties.86 The dissenting Justices in Hobby Lobby went further, arguing

82. Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2015).
83. See Temple Emmanuel v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 975 N.E.2d
433 (Mass. 2012).
84. See, e.g., Ginyard v. Church of God in Christ Ky. First Jurisdiction, Inc., 6 F.
Supp. 3d 725, 729 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (“[R]egardless of how the Plaintiff’s claims are
labeled, their resolution would require this Court to enter into areas implicating religious
freedom.”); Kavanagh v. Zwilling, 997 F. Supp. 2d 241, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (extending
the ministerial exception to defamation claims); Purdum v. Purdum, 301 P.3d 718, 727
(Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (same); Fisher v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2014-Ohio-944, 6
N.E.3d 1254, at ¶ 34 (1st Dist.) (extending Hosanna-Tabor to claims of promissory estoppel
and intentional infliction of emotional distress because they were “inextricably entangled”
with employment discrimination claim); Smith v. White, 2014-Ohio-130, 7 N.E.3d 552,
at ¶ 66 (2d Dist.) (barring various tort claims on the basis of the ministerial exception);
Reese v. Gen. Assembly of Faith Cumberland Presbyterian Church in Am., 425 S.W.3d
625, 629 (Tex. App. 2014) (“extend[ing] the crux of Hosanna-Tabor” to include contract
and tort claims); Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, 286 P.3d 357, 363–67 (Wash.
2012) (extending Hosanna-Tabor to reach tort claims of negligent retention and supervision);
DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 2012 WI 94, ¶ 30, 343 Wis. 2d 83, 816 N.W.2d 878
(extending Hosanna-Tabor to breach of contract actions brought by ministerial employees).
85. See Lund, supra note 40, at 1211–20 (describing the ways in which courts have
evaluated various kinds of tort claims in relation to free exercise values).
86. The Court declined to reach the constitutional claims raised by plaintiffs Conestoga
Wood and the Hahns. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785
(2014). That decision can be justified as a matter of constitutional avoidance, but it is
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for an absolutely exception-less interpretation and expansion of Smith that
Smith itself does not warrant.87 No Justice in Hosanna-Tabor took issue
with the Smith approach to individual free exercise—not even Justice
Alito, who as a circuit court judge on a few occasions read Smith reticently
to find it inapplicable based on the individualized assessment exception
that the Smith Court seemed to carve out of its rule.88
The narrowness of Hosanna-Tabor’s scope has become plain as well.
Three years ago, Professor Michael McConnell wondered, “what implications
does Hosanna-Tabor have for the current controversy over the federal
government’s decision to require religious employers that provide health
insurance for their employees to include contraceptive services . . . free of
cost?”89 The answer, after Hobby Lobby and related cases concerning the
“accommodation” conferred by the federal government to objecting non
profit religious entities, is: none at all. At least part of the reason is that
litigants may not have pressed for the application of Hosanna-Tabor to
this context, notwithstanding the open-ended quality of the Supreme
Court’s view both of the boundaries of ministerial status and of the type
of organization that could be eligible to claim the ministerial exception. As
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recently put it in one of these cases, “The
Court’s reasoning in Hosanna–Tabor does not extend beyond ecclesiastical
employment matters.”90 Many cases concerning the contraception mandate
have not discussed Hosanna-Tabor or the ministerial exception, and those
that have discussed it uniformly have found it inapplicable.91 The
nevertheless notable that no Justice in the majority voiced any reservation at all about the
Smith approach.
87. The Hobby Lobby dissent observed: “Any First Amendment Free Exercise
Clause claim Hobby Lobby or Conestoga might assert is foreclosed by this Court’s
decision in Employment Div. [v. Smith].”) Id. at 2790 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted). As I have explained elsewhere, an interpretation of Smith as
“foreclos[ing]” any free exercise inquiry in cases like Hobby Lobby is erroneous. See
DEGIROLAMI, supra note 5, at 147–66; Marc DeGirolami, The Bishops Statement on Religious
Freedom and Widespread Misunderstanding of the State of Free Exercise, MIRROR OF
JUST. (Apr. 14, 2012), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2012/04/the-bishopsstatement-on-religious-freedom-and-widespread-misunderstanding-of-the-state-of-free
exer.html [https://perma.cc/H4YL-MCQX].
88. See Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004); Fraternal Order
of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
89. McConnell, supra note 24, at 835.
90. Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 274
(D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 446 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2015) (No. 14-1453).
91. See, e.g., Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 7 F. Supp. 3d
88, 105 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert.
granted, 136 S. Ct. 446 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2015) (No. 14-1453) (“This Court agrees with the
vast majority of courts which have considered the issue and found that the contraceptive
services regulations are neutral and generally applicable, and accordingly have rejected
Free Exercise Clause challenges.”).
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dominance of the various statutory frameworks—federal and state RFRAs
and RLUIPA—as the primary legal vehicles through which accommodations
are evaluated further highlights the limited impact of Hosanna-Tabor.92
But as a general doctrinal approach to constitutional free exercise, Smith
is in no danger of being eclipsed by Hosanna-Tabor.93
III. HOSANNA-TABOR IN ECLIPSE
In fact, in light of Hosanna-Tabor’s relatively minor influence on
constitutional free exercise and religious accommodation specifically, one
might instead wonder whether it is the case that has been—or is likely to
be—eclipsed. The deliberately minimalist, cautious, and fact-bound style
in which it was written94—indeed, the very fact that it was narrow enough
to generate a 9-0 vote—has made it possible for some lower courts to limit
its application.
In addition to the ministerial exception’s failure to influence any feature
of the contraception mandate litigation,95 some courts have stringently
demanded evidence of the presence of nearly all of the factors examined
by the Hosanna-Tabor Court in determining whether an employee qualifies
as ministerial, the claims and beliefs of the religious institution about the
employee’s ministerial status notwithstanding.96 Other courts have confined
the language in Hosanna-Tabor referring to the ministerial exception as
applicable to “religiously affiliated institutions” to reach only churches,
or institutions intimately associated with churches, thereby excluding
hospitals, universities, and other religious charities.97 And still others have
92. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2013) (church autonomy
cases have nothing to do with RFRA exemptions). The ministerial exception has likewise
been found irrelevant in controversies over religious exemptions from state anti-discrimination
laws. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶67, 309 P.3d 53.
93. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 823.
94. See DEGIROLAMI, supra note 5, at 178–79; supra note 90.
95. See supra note 91.
96. See, e.g., Herx v. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-South Bend, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168,
1176–77 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (rejecting Catholic school’s description of a teacher as a minister
in a sex and disability discrimination suit notwithstanding her own acknowledgment that the
school expected her to serve as a Christian role model); Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati,
No. 1:11–CV–00251, 2012 WL 1068165, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (declining to
extend Hosanna-Tabor on the basis of defense that all teachers were expected to be
Catholic role models).
97. See, e.g., Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., No. 11-CV-9137(NSR), 2013 WL
5477600, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (concluding that a hospital which at one time
was affiliated with the United Methodist Church was not a “religiously affiliated entity”
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held that concededly ministerial employees asserting anything other than
employment discrimination claims are not prevented from proceeding by
the ministerial exception.98
Several courts have simply held that Hosanna-Tabor applies when they
are faced with more or less the same factual circumstances present in
Hosanna-Tabor—essentially limiting it to its facts—or otherwise recognized
as within the ministerial exception before Hosanna-Tabor.99 Indeed, it
might be that by issuing such a narrow and fact-specific opinion, HosannaTabor has actually shrunk the scope of the ministerial exception by
comparison with what was previously available in at least some federal
circuits and states. Some of these, for example, had adopted broader or more
categorical views than appear in the Hosanna-Tabor majority opinion—and
that are more closely echoed in Justice Thomas’s concurrence100 about a
religious institution’s autonomy rights under the ministerial exception.101
And yet it would misdescribe matters to call Hosanna-Tabor and the
ministerial exception more broadly as having been overpowered or even
weakened in any significant way by the Smith framework or any other
doctrine of permissive religious accommodation. The ministerial exception
remains powerful within its narrow sphere of application. And just as
Hosanna-Tabor may have narrowed the scope of the ministerial exception
under Hosanna-Tabor); Winbery v. La. Coll., 2013-339, p. 8 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13);
124 So. 3d 1212, 1217 (declining to extend Hosanna-Tabor to a college whose board of
trustees was elected by the Louisiana Baptist Convention because college was not a church).
98. See, e.g., Doe v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1225,
1232 (E.D. Wash. 2013) (describing Hosanna-Tabor’s holding as “sharply circumscribed,” and
holding that ministerial exception did not bar state negligence and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims); Second Episcopal Dist. African Methodist Episcopal Church
v. Prioleau, 49 A.3d 812, 817 (D.C. 2012) (holding, without discussion of Hosanna-Tabor,
that ordained minister could proceed with breach of contract action against church
notwithstanding ministerial exception); Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426
S.W.3d 597, 615 (Ky. 2014) (holding that though a theology professor was a ministerial
employee of a seminary, his breach of contract action was not barred by the ministerial
exception).
99. See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 172–73 (5th
Cir. 2012) (holding that Hosanna-Tabor bars a suit by a former music director against a
church claiming that he was fired in violation of the ADA and ADEA). A Seventh Circuit
decision before Hosanna-Tabor had held essentially the same thing in an age
discrimination suit by a church organist. Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d
1036, 1036 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d
668, 673 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (finding Hosanna-Tabor applicable because “each of the factors
that the Supreme Court considered in Hosanna-Tabor are present here.”).
100. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
710–11 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring).
101. See, e.g., Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299,
299 (4th Cir. 2004) (ministerial exception shielded institution from claims by a Kosher
supervisor); Pardue v. Ctr. City Consortium Sch., Inc., 875 A.2d 669, 699 (D.C. 2005)
(ministerial exception shielded parochial school from claims by its former headmaster).
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in some cases and for some jurisdictions, it may have broadened it in
others.102 As discussed above, the scope of the ministerial exception has
been extended by several courts beyond the facts of Hosanna-Tabor.103
And as to its own particular sphere of influence, Hosanna-Tabor is in no
danger of being overruled. The fact that the general reach of the ministerial
exception after Hosanna-Tabor remains highly limited with respect to the
full panoply of religious accommodation controversies—which are in any
case governed primarily by various statutory frameworks—does not mean
that Hosanna-Tabor has been eclipsed.
IV. THE WANING OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
The previous three sections might be summarized as follows: Smith
remains the primary constitutional vehicle for evaluating free exercise
claims, even though the multiple statutory frameworks, state and federal,
have largely rendered the Smith approach a secondary matter in adjudicating
religious accommodation cases. The ministerial exception is just that—
an exception to the core constitutional rule of accommodation, with little
to no effect on statutory religious exemption cases outside its narrow
reach. Hosanna-Tabor has been limited or extended in a few subsequent
cases but, by and large, remains ineffectual as a full-fledged alternative to
religious accommodation under the Constitution.
While this is a plausible description, it misses something about the
wider context in which requests for religious accommodation are now
received and evaluated. Opponents of religious accommodation have long
viewed them as sanctioning unfairly advantageous and unequal treatment
by the state, and the state frequently has agreed when the accommodation
involved matters of great weight to it—conscription into military service
for the defense of the Republic, for example.104 By contrast, when the

102. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 38, at 1019. See generally EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010). See also Petruska v.
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e join seven of our sister circuits in
adopting the [ministerial] exception and hold that it applies to any claim, the resolution of
which would limit a religious institution’s right to choose who will perform particular
spiritual functions.”).
103. Lund, supra note 40, at 1190–93, 1220–21 (explaining the ministerial exception
as a legal exception that bars ministers from bringing “employment related” claims against
churches). See supra notes 82–84.
104. See generally Philip Hamburger, Religious Freedom in Philadelphia, 54 EMORY
L.J. 1603 (2005). Quakers were not compelled to fight, but they were not exempted either:
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nature of the government interest was less grave—as, for example, in the
case of the exemption of Quakers from the taking of oaths in the early
Republic—religious accommodation could proceed notwithstanding claims
of unequal treatment or the potential for injury to broader civic interests.105
The different treatment of these kinds of cases in the early American
experience gestures toward an additional reason for the growing unpopularity
of religious accommodation. The modern expansion of the reach of the
state has resulted in a concomitant increase in the kinds of recognition,
and validation, that it can now confer. As the ambit of state authority has
expanded, the ways in which people may be negatively affected, or harmed,
by a state-sanctioned religious accommodation have likewise expanded.
Religious accommodations are now said, for example, to implicate injuries
to the “dignity” of those who oppose them, the implication of which is
that the state’s authority includes the power to confer individual dignity
as a self-standing civic good. People want to be dignified by the state,106
their self-worth to be accorded official validation, and they perceive statecountenanced indignities meant for the protection of religious freedom as
real injuries demanding state remediation.
Yet offenses to dignity are only the most extreme example of the overall
expansion of government interests.107 For we are now at some considerable
distance from Smith’s dystopian warnings about the threat of anarchy or

they were required to pay an expensive “equivalent.” See id. at 1625–26. See also Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 459 (1971) (“Other fields of legal obligation aside, it is
undoubted that the nature of conscription, much less war itself, requires the personal
desires and perhaps the dissenting views of those who must serve to be subordinated in
some degree to the pursuit of public purposes.”).
105. See DEGIROLAMI, supra note 5, at 154–55. The government interest in oathswearing was nevertheless substantial as a means of maintaining the integrity of official
legal processes.
106. For acute analysis of the dignitarian turn in the gay rights context, see Noa BenAsher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 243, 263, 282 (2014) (“Windsor is a pivotal moment in the metamorphosis of
the legal homosexual. The legal homosexual, at least in states where same-sex marriage
is legally recognized, is portrayed as a morally dignified person.”).
107. A well argued, but similarly sweeping, expansion of the ambit of the state’s
interests holds that the government can regulate expression that violates norms of “full and
equal citizenship” and results in associated harm. See generally Nelson S. Tebbe,
Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648 (2013). As a corollary to his
argument that the government is prohibited from endorsing any view that “abridges full
and equal citizenship in a free society,” Professor Tebbe writes: “Translated into political
morality, government nonendorsement would mean that the limits identified in this Article
should function as the only restrictions on government’s power to endorse ideas. Within
those limits, government should be free to favor or disfavor a wide range of views, even
if they are comprehensive.” Id. at 699–700. Needless to say, there are numerous religious
doctrines and beliefs that are likely to violate a categorical norm of political liberalism of
this type. Id. at 662 n.56.
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governmental impotence that would result from overgenerous religious
accommodations. In a society in which the government assumes an
increasingly large role in the life of the citizenry, more injuries are
transformed into legally—and perhaps even constitutionally—cognizable
rights. The number and type of state interests that qualify as compelling
swell to match the new dignitarian and other harms caused by religious
and other accommodations. And the protection of rights becomes a zero
sum game, as every win for religious accommodation is a legally cognizable,
but unvindicated, loss for somebody else.
There is no clearer manifestation of this development than the recent
emergence of the so-called “third-party-harms” theory of the Establishment
Clause in response to claims for religious accommodation in the Hobby
Lobby litigation.108 The core of the theory is that permissive religious
accommodations that impose “material” or “significant” “burdens on
identifiable third parties” violate the Establishment Clause. Before
describing it in greater detail, however, it is worth noting the genesis of
the theory: the federal government’s decision to intervene in an area that
it had never touched before. The catalyst for an assertion of third party
harms as independent grounds for an Establishment Clause claim in
Hobby Lobby was the government’s assumption of power to mandate the
cost-free provision of contraceptive coverage by private employers. Once
it did that, the non-receipt of cost-free contraceptive coverage by anybody
who desired it could be restyled by the theory’s exponents as the deprivation
of an “entitlement”109 and the shifting of a “burden” to a third party. That
burden was generated by the enlargement of the government’s powers and
the distension of its interests. Likewise, resistance to the government’s
newly assumed powers on the basis of conflict with preexisting rights of

108. The theory is elaborated (though with different titles and slightly different
formulations), among other places, in Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman,
Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment
Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51 (2014); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G.
Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014); Nelson Tebbe,
Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 25 (2015); Nelson
Tebbe, Richard Schragger, & Micah Schwartzman, The Establishment Clause and the
Contraception Mandate, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013), http:// balkin.blogspot.com/
2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause.html [https://perma.cc/MCE7-CJCA].
109. Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 108, at 59 (“Common sense tells us that a
RFRA exemption of Hobby Lobby from the Mandate deprives employees of a valuable
legal entitlement.”).
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religious freedom in RFRA and similar laws could now be caricatured as
retrogressively libertarian, trading implicitly on the fanciful metaphor of
lawless “anarchy” prophesied in Smith.110
The third-party-harms theory is implausible as a doctrinal matter.111 It
depends heavily on Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, a pre-RFRA case that
involved an “absolute” legislative exemption for employees from working
on their chosen Sabbath day.112 A Presbyterian sued Caldor under the statute
after the company dismissed him from a management position because
he would not work on Sundays. Because the law took no account of the
secular interests of third parties (the employers), and gave individuals an
absolute right not to work on the Sabbath day of their choice, the law was
found to violate the Establishment Clause. The “unyielding weighting in
favor of Sabbath observers” resulted in what the Court held was an
“absolute and unqualified burden” on employers—a burden so severe that
it would actually “compel” non-believers—as well as those with different
religious beliefs113— to act in the name of religion.114
The theory’s defenders misread Caldor to authorize a doctrinally
superfluous Establishment Clause claim on behalf of third parties who are

110. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1453 (2015). It should be clear that I am not claiming that the federal government is
without constitutional or other legal authority to create new entitlements (provided, of
course, that they do not conflict with other laws, including those that protect religious
freedom). My claim is instead descriptive: the expansion of those secular interests deemed
“compelling” by the government increasingly will run up against existing legal protections
for religious accommodation in laws like RFRA.
111. I have explained these views elsewhere. See, e.g., Marc DeGirolami, On the
Claim that Exemptions from the Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause, MIRROR OF
JUST. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2013/12/exemptions
from-the-mandate-do-not-violate-the-establishment-clause.html [https://perma.cc/8WN9
SZZ6]; see also Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Hobby
Lobby & Conestoga, et al., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
[hereinafter Amicus Brief on Constitutional Law Scholars] (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 356639.
112. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 704–06, 708–11 (1984).
113. This important feature of Caldor is emphasized in Nathan S. Chapman, State
Action, the Establishment Clause, and Distributions of Liberty (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
114. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709–10. The extremity of the burden in Caldor is helpfully
illustrated in 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT
AND FAIRNESS 338, 344 (2008).
If a business, such as a school, operated only five days a week, it would have to grant
an employee one of those days off if that was his Sabbath. . . .
....
Given the absolute privilege it provided, the Connecticut law held invalid in Estate of
Thornton could well have encouraged people to join religious groups that worship on the
day they would want off.
Id. In Greenawalt’s example, the statute’s “unyielding weighting” in favor of accommodation
might even force the school to close down.
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“significantly burdened” by any religious accommodation, which, they
claim, could be brought alongside an identical claim by the government
in defense of its law as part of the compelling interest statutory inquiry.115
Whatever “significant burdens” on third parties might be for the theory’s
defenders—more on this below—they do not seem to be at all the same
as the “absolute and unqualified burdens” described in Caldor. But the
larger doctrinal issue is that the Supreme Court later held in Cutter v.
Wilkinson that the statutes—whether RFRA or RLUIPA—“properly
appli[ed]”116 already account for the interests of third parties as part of the
compelling interest component of the strict scrutiny test.117 Compelling
state interests include third party interests within the statutory calculus.
Indeed, one might simply say that compelling state interests just exactly
are third party interests of adequate gravity. Whose interests is the
government protecting in resisting a religious accommodation if not those
of third parties? The third-party-harms theory simply gives exemption
opponents another bite at the apple.118 No subsequent case—and, indeed,
no individual Justice on the current Court—has authorized a duplicative
third party Establishment Clause claim119 outside the statutory framework.120
115. See, e.g., Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 108, at 54 (discussing the “shifting” of
“significant costs on others”); Tebbe, Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 108.
116. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). Cutter concerned a facial challenge
to RLUIPA, which the Court unanimously rejected, but there is no difference between
RFRA and RLUIPA for these purposes.
117. See Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of
Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 46 (2014) (“It seems very unlikely that an
accommodation that is required by RFRA would implicate the Caldor Court’s concern
about the ‘unyielding weighting’ of religious objectors’ concerns over other (public and
private) interests.”).
118. See Amicus Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars, supra note 111, at 19 (“RFRA . . .
already takes into account the government’s interest in protecting third parties”).
119. In fact, it is not clear how a third party could actually bring such a claim. The
Establishment Clause applies against the government. If the government resists granting
a religious accommodation—as in Hobby Lobby—how could a third party sue the
government alleging that an accommodation would violate the Establishment Clause? Or
would the third party need to wait until the accommodation was held by a court to be
required by RFRA or RLUIPA, and only then bring an action alleging that though the
accommodation is mandated by RFRA or RLUIPA, it nevertheless violates the
Establishment Clause? Or instead would the third party need to intervene in an ongoing
RFRA or RLUIPA litigation to assert its Establishment Clause interest (but against
whom?), an interest that the government was already asserting in defense of its law?
120. The Hobby Lobby Court rejected the claim that religious accommodations are
problematic so long as the government program at issue confers a benefit on a third party.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014). In doing so, it
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More important than the doctrinal mistakes on which the theory rests,
however, are the philosophical commitments it reflects. The issue is the
nature of a legally cognizable harm to third parties resulting from a
permissive religious accommodation, and the kind of harm that should
defeat—as a constitutional matter or otherwise— such an accommodation.
Defenders of the theory have not always been clear about precisely which
types of harms to third parties—other than deprivations of cost-free
contraception—rise to the level of significance. Harms come in many forms,
after all—physical, emotional, financial, symbolic, and so on. If the standard
truly is as open-ended as significance or materiality, then it is difficult to
see why, for example, financial harms alone would be cognizable: some
symbolic harms might well be more significant or material than some
financial harms, and vice versa. But it should be plain that as the threshold
of significance decreases, the reach of the theory, the number of cognizable
third party harms, and the threat to permissive religious accommodation,
all increase. Moreover, as the government assumes to itself greater power
to mandate the conferral of benefits, the deprivation of those benefits as a
consequence of a religious accommodation becomes more amenable to
classification as a significant or material harm.
The issue of symbolic or dignitarian harm is particularly problematic.
If perceived affronts or injuries to one’s personal dignity constitute a
significant or material harm to a third party, then it is difficult to see how
many permissive religious accommodations could survive. Laws reflect
morally and politically charged messages. Whether the subject is education,
public health, drugs, sexuality, commerce, prisons, insurance, the environment,
or the military, laws embody particular moral convictions and impose,
even if tacitly, particular moral views on those subject to them. Religious
accommodations are decisions by the government to permit limited dissent
from these moral messages. In accommodating religious objectors, the
state might—though it need not—be perceived not merely to authorize
limited disagreement with the law, but to countenance disrespect for the
moral views underlying it or even for the moral dignity of those who are
its intended beneficiaries. But if the state comes to have powerful legal

stated that putative burdens on third parties resulting from religious accommodations are
evaluated through the statutory compelling interest/least restrictive means mechanism, not
through an extraneous Establishment Clause claim. Id.
Justice Ginsburg has come the closest to endorsing the third-party harms theory in her
two-sentence concurring opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor, in Holt v. Hobbs: “Unlike
the exemption this Court approved in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., accommodating
petitioner’s religious belief in this case would not detrimentally affect others who do not
share petitioner’s belief. On that understanding, I join the Court’s opinion.” 135 S. Ct.
853, 867 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Not even she, however, makes
any mention of the Establishment Clause as a basis for differentiating the cases.
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interests in remedying symbolic or dignitarian offenses, then that may
well render many permissive religious accommodations illegal.
In a recent article in the Yale Law Journal, Professors Douglas NeJaime
and Reva Siegel argue that accommodations based on claims of “complicity”
in the religiously objectionable acts of third parties impose “special”
“material and dignitary burdens” on those third parties.121 NeJaime and
Siegel purport to distinguish the type of claim for religious accommodation
in Hobby Lobby—and several other contemporary conflicts concerning
sexual equality and autonomy—from the claims for religious accommodation
that preceded it, inasmuch as they believe there to be distinctions of “form”
and “social logic” between accommodations grounded in claims of
complicity with sinful behavior and other varieties of accommodation.
The formal distinction is that complicity-based claims for accommodation
focus on the sinful behavior of third parties, while other sorts of claims
for religious accommodation do not.122 So, for example, a Muslim
inmate’s requested exemption from a prison’s no-beard policy does not
implicate claims of complicity in other people’s sinful behavior;123 neither
does the request for exemption for one’s children from compulsory schooling
laws;124 but a religious organization’s claim for accommodation from a
government mandate requiring the cost-free provision of contraceptive
coverage to its employees focuses on the employees’ sinful behavior. The
orientation of complicity-based accommodation claims toward third parties
is said to impose unique or “distinctive” “material and dignitary harms” on
those third parties that are absent in other cases of religious accommodation.125
The “social logic” of complicity-based claims for accommodation is also
said to be distinct, inasmuch as these sorts of claims are frequently “entangled
in long-running ‘culture war’ conflicts about laws that break from traditional
morality.”126
NeJaime and Siegel’s argument about formal differences among various
types of religious accommodations is correct: not all requests for religious
accommodation take the form of a claim concerning complicity. The
Native Americans in Smith, for example, were seeking an accommodation

121. Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2566 (2015).
122. Id. at 2519.
123. Id. at 2524 (citing Holt, 135 S. Ct. 853).
124. Id. at 2526–27 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
125. Id. at 2566.
126. Id. at 2526, 2542.
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from drug laws in order to engage in a practice that they believed was
religiously required, not arguing that failure to accommodate them would
render them complicit in evil or sinful conduct. But the authors’ claim
that complicity-based religious accommodations were generally unheard
of in the First Amendment religious freedom canon before Hobby Lobby
is incorrect. Claims of complicity with evil or sin as a basis for religious
accommodation are hardly unique to the post-Hobby Lobby period, and
are present even in some of the cases that the NeJaime and Siegel raise.
When the Amish parents in Wisconsin v. Yoder objected on behalf of their
children to the state’s compulsory school attendance laws, it is true that
the Court “conceptualized the interests of the Amish children as aligned
with their parents, such that the accommodation benefited, rather than
potentially harmed, the children themselves.”127 But this does not mean
that the objection in Yoder did not concern complicity. The Amish parents
were claiming that forcing their children to attend school implicated them,
and their children, in—demanded that they acquiesce and participate in—
a way of life with third parties to which they strongly objected on religious
grounds:
[R]espondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish
communities generally that their children’s attendance at high school, public or
private, was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. They believed that,
by sending their children to high school, they would not only expose themselves to
the danger of the censure of the church community, but, as found by the county
court, also endanger their own salvation and that of their children.128

The Amish were seeking an exemption for their children from participating
in conduct, in which other children participated, precisely because by
participating in that conduct they would be implicated in the salvationthreatening behavior of other third parties—the children who did attend
school, as well as the parents, teachers, administrators, and others committed
to public schooling.129 Arguments from complicity, here as in criminal
law, focus on objectionable conduct, not objectionable people130: “Co
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 2526.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209.
For further discussion, see Marc O. DeGirolami, No Tears for Creon, 15 LEGAL
THEORY 245, 251–58 (2009).
130. It is the accomplice’s state of mind with respect to the principal’s commission
of the offense, not with respect to anything about the principal himself, that triggers
accomplice liability. For example, A is B’s accomplice if he supplies B with a gun with
the intention that B kill C. The mens rea of accomplice liability relates to A’s mental state
with respect to the result—a killing—not with respect to anything about the character of
the person doing the killing (B). B’s acts become A’s acts; B’s character does not become
A’s character. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 1228, 1236 (Pa. 2006). So,
too, in the religious exemption context: the objection is to the conduct of the third party,
not to the character of the third party. It is not necessary, therefore, that the Amish (for
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operation . . . is concurrence with another in a sinful act. This might be
done by acting with another in sin . . . or by being the occasion of the sin
of another.”131
Claims of conscientious objection to participation in military service or
related activities frequently are even clearer cases of arguments grounded
in complicity. In Thomas v. Review Board, for example, the claimant’s
request for religious accommodation also was based on an objection
dependent on the concept—if not the precise language—of complicity:
“Thomas admitted before the referee that he would not object to working
for United States Steel or Inland Steel . . . produc[ing] the raw product
necessary for the production of any kind of tank. . . [because I] would not be
a direct party to whoever they shipped it to [and] would not be . . . chargeable
in . . . conscience.”132 By contrast, working on tank turrets, Thomas believed,
would render him a “direct party to”—that is, someone who aided or
assisted133—those third parties who contributed to the war effort, soldiers,
for example, an effort to which Thomas objected in religious conscience.
NeJaime and Siegel purport to distinguish Thomas on the ground that
Thomas did not “single out a particular group of citizens as sinning.”134
That is false: Thomas did single out those citizens to whom weaponry

example) be concerned for the souls of non-Amish others in order to be implicated in
complicity with the acts of non-Amish others.
131. 1 HENRY DAVIS, S.J., MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY: HUMAN ACTS, LAW,
SIN, VIRTUE 341 (L. W. Geddes, S.J. ed., 8th ed. 1959) (emphasis added).
132. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
133. The actus reus required for complicity in criminal law is generally minimal: any
words or behavior that could have aided or influenced the principal actor are sufficient.
See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause, and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of
Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 359 (1985). There is academic debate about the precise
quality of an accomplice’s mens rea. See Sherif Girgis, The Mens Rea of Accomplice
Liability: Supporting Intentions, 123 YALE L.J. 460, 468–83 (2013) (discussing various
possibilities). As applied to the religious exemption context, the claim is that aiding even
in minimal ways evinces a religiously objectionable intent to engage in the conduct of the
third-party principals. See Brief of 67 Catholic Theologians and Ethicists as Amici Curiae
in Support of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. at 2,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356),
2014 WL 316716.
The Catholic theological tradition, in common with related Christian traditions, has welldeveloped concepts used to assess whether a believer may “cooperate in”—i.e., facilitate or
assist—the religiously objectionable action of another person. Several objective criteria,
commonly invoked by the Catholic theological tradition, determine whether such cooperation
would cause the believer to share in moral responsibility for that action. Id.
134. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 121, at 2526 n.45.
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would be shipped and who would use it in ways to which he objected in
conscience.135 But it is also irrelevant. NeJaime and Siegel’s repeated
emphasis on the characterological or moral association of the accomplice
with the third party represents a persistent confusion in their account.136
The singling out of the morality or the character traits of third parties
makes no difference, since the conduct, not the character, of the third party
is what matters for complicity-based claims. Even if Thomas had not singled
out specific people, therefore, the form of such religious accommodations
is perfectly familiar. It is a claim that one’s participation in a practice or
an activity will assist third parties in the prosecution or consummation of
that activity, and that this assistance implicates the believer in violations
of religious conscience.137
NeJaime and Siegel also claim that a complicity-based religious
accommodation is distinctive because it “does not entail costs borne by
society as a whole”138 but that these costs are instead borne entirely by
discrete third parties. Similarly, Professor Frederick Gedicks claims that
the harms to third parties are unique in cases like Hobby Lobby because
such costs are not “fully distributed through all society—or a very large

135. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
136. See, e.g., NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 121, at 2519 (emphasizing the accomplice’s
“relationship to the third party”); id. at 2527 (“Because complicity-based conscience
claims are oriented toward third parties who do not share the claimant’s beliefs about the
conduct in question, their accommodation has potential material and dignitary implications for
those the claimants condemn.”); id. at 2542–43 (observing that complicity-based claims
can have social effects on the prospects for “traditional morality”).
137. Several other religious accommodation cases reflect precisely a concern about
implication in and contribution to the sinful conduct of others. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 695–96 (1986) (noting that claimant’s objection to obtaining a Social
Security number was grounded in the belief that participation in the system would defile
his daughter’s “spiritual purity” and that uses of the number by others “over which she has
no control, will serve to “rob the spirit” of his daughter and prevent her from attaining
greater spiritual power.”); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 255 (1982) (noting a
Biblical basis for the Amish claimant’s belief that participation in the Social Security
system was “sinful” because it reflected a failure to provide for one’s elderly family
members); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 440–41 (1971).
In line with religious counseling and numerous religious texts, Negre, a devout
Catholic, believes that it is his duty as a faithful Catholic to discriminate between
‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars, and to forswear participation in the latter. His
assessment of the Vietnam conflict as an unjust war became clear in his mind
after completion of infantry training, and Negre is now firmly of the view that
any personal involvement in that war would contravene his conscience . . . .
Id. It is true that Bowen and Lee were decided against the claimants, but they nevertheless
involved complicity-based arguments.
138. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 121, at 2542.
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segment of it.”139 But that, too, has nothing uniquely to do with the form
of such accommodations or with anything special about the religious
objection in cases like Hobby Lobby. Conscientious objections to military
conscription based on claims of complicity in the evil of war—which
create massive burdens on non-objecting third parties, as evidenced by
various third parties’ adamant resistance to them in the Early Republic140
—generally are borne by society as a whole.” That does not make the
objections any less about complicity or any more conceptually problematic
than other accommodations. Conversely, other sorts of accommodations may
impose serious costs on identifiable third parties—rather than on society as
a whole—and yet have nothing to do with complicity, for example,
testimonial privileges for clergy-penitent communications.141
139. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives,
Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 153,
173 (2015).
140. Hamburger, supra note 104, at 1612, 1623, 1630, 1631. Here again, I disagree
with Professor Gedicks and Ms. Van Tassell, who claim that the Establishment
Clause forbids those accommodations that affect “private ordering”—that is, those which
might induce people to act in ways that they would not otherwise act, but for the religious
accommodation. Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 108, at 366. Against the objection
that such a rule would almost surely render all conscientious objection religious accommodations
unconstitutional, Gedicks and Van Tassell write that
[I]t is difficult to imagine that permissive exemption of religious pacifists from
the draft would be a factor in the decision of nonpacifists to comply with or
evade the draft [because] . . . many ordinary activities involve risks of death that
people undertake without a thought, like driving a car (being hit by a drunk or
otherwise reckless driver) and traveling by air (plane crashes). The risk of harm
is so remote that people simply do not consider it in deciding whether to drive
or to fly.
Id. at 367 & n.114.
With all due respect, analogies comparing the risk of driving a car or flying in a plane
with the risk of going to war are not convincing and demonstrate the folly of adopting
“private ordering” Establishment Clause limits on permissive legislative accommodations.
See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 459–60.
The fear of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, apparently,
is that exemption of objectors to particular wars would weaken the resolve of
those who otherwise would feel themselves bound to serve despite personal cost,
uneasiness at the prospect of violence, or even serious moral reservations or
policy objections concerning the particular conflict.
Id.
141. See, e.g., Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1532–33 (9th Cir. 1997)
(“All fifty states have enacted statutes ‘granting some form of testimonial privilege to
clergy-communicant communications. Neither scholars nor courts question the legitimacy
of the privilege, and attorneys rarely litigate the issue.’” (quoting Developments in the
Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1556 (1985))).
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Decisions about cost allocation in the face of a legally cognizable
religious objection are the government’s, not the claimant’s. In Hobby
Lobby, it was the federal government’s decision, not Hobby Lobby’s, not
to allocate the cost of contraception coverage to “society as a whole,”
through the mechanism of taxation, for example, but instead to impose it
on private religious objectors.142 The fact that Hobby Lobby was adjudged
to have a valid claim for exemption under RFRA does not mean that
anything in the nature of its objection had the necessary effect of imposing
the costs of its objection on third parties; it had that effect only because of
the scheme selected by the government. The new “baseline,” one in which
the government assumed to itself new regulatory powers in areas formerly
not deemed to be within its superintendence, was set and controlled by the
government.143 There is therefore nothing unusual or novel about the form
of a religious accommodation dependent on the idea of complicity, whether
as a matter of the nature of the third party burden or the allocation of
accommodation’s costs.
NeJaime and Siegel’s arguments about the distinctive “social logic” of
complicity-based claims are weaker still. The claim here is that requests for
religious accommodation based on complicity in the sin of third parties have
served as a rallying cry in the mobilization and empowerment of conservative
causes—specifically in the contexts of abortion and contraception—and as a
result they may impose peculiar kinds of harms on third parties. These
sociological observations about political mobilization may or may not be
true, and they may or may not be unique to the sorts of controversies that

142. Gedicks labels this argument “disingenuous” because he speculates that it might
be expensive for the government to fund the mandate itself and because it is “not politically
viable” for it to do so. Gedicks, supra note 139, at 157–62. If the quantity of money needed
for the government to fund the mandate is indeed as great as Gedicks believes, then that is
all fodder for the compelling interest or least restrictive means analysis and does not
transfer responsibility for the burden on third parties to the religious claimant. As for the
political viability of government funding, and Gedicks’s protest that “political conservatives”
would surely stymie any such plans, this sort of political bellyaching has little to do with
the least restrictive means analysis: if every speculative grumble about the political
infeasibility of less restrictive means were legally operative, there would be nothing left
of the least restrictive means component of the test. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
143. See Garnett, supra note 117, at 46–47.
The argument that an exemption for Hobby Lobby and other employers would
violate the Establishment Clause takes as the relevant starting point, or baseline,
the requirement that employers provide employees with no-cost-sharing contraception
coverage and employees entitlement to that coverage. But, surely Congress
could depart from that asserted baseline by undoing the contraception-coverage
rules in their entirety without violating the Establishment Clause.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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interest the authors.144 But why this should be relevant to the conceptual
distinctiveness of a class of religious accommodations, rather than simply
to the political contentiousness that some religious accommodations tend
to excite, is a mystery. One can stipulate that the requested accommodation
in Hobby Lobby was more controversial in certain political and cultural
circles than the accommodation in, say, Holt v. Hobbs, but by itself, that
distinction tells us little more than that religious accommodation since the
passage of RFRA and RLUIPA has been easy enough to tolerate so long
as it did not implicate certain specific secular concerns. Claims about the
“social logic” of accommodation illustrate more about the authors’ own
ideological investments than anything singular about the structure of
complicity-based accommodation claims.
Indeed, it becomes apparent that one of NeJaime and Siegel’s particular
concerns is with the ways in which any religious accommodation—
complicity-based or otherwise—can generate “dignitary” harms to third
parties, and specifically to the dignity of those who disagree with what the
authors describe as “traditional morality” about various sexual issues.145
A leading antidiscrimination scholar has likewise noted that the prevention
of harms to “dignity” and the stigmatization of discrimination are two of

144. Demands for exemption from military service based on religious conscientious
objection during the Vietnam War—viewed in the context of all of the associated political
and cultural apparatus of dissent, for example, the burning of draft cards, anti-war marches,
the involvement of Students for a Democratic Society and similar organizations in teachins and other forms of protest, during that period—were motivated by claims of complicity
and were not especially associated with conservative political causes.
145. I focus in this paper on the authors’ claims about dignitarian harm, but their other
arguments about the unique “material” harms that complicity-based religious objections
necessarily impose on third parties are not well supported. They argue, for example, that
complicity-based religious objections have the special consequence of denying “health
services” of various types to third parties. As already explained, however, there is nothing
logically compelled in the complicity-based objection in Hobby Lobby that would have
such an effect. Furthermore, to prove such a claim, one would need data about the
availability of and access to contraception, or the availability of information about obtaining
contraception, to those of Hobby Lobby’s, and similarly objecting organizations’,
employees that desired it after the decision. But NeJaime and Siegel do not provide such
data. Instead, they speculate that “in more conservative, religious, and rural parts of the
country, complicity-based refusals have the capacity to construct separate, localized legal
orders.” NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 121, at 2574. I take it that such developments
would be of concern even if they did not occur in “conservative, religious, and rural”
locations, if there were evidence that they were occurring.
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the three “canonical” functions of antidiscrimination laws generally.146
Religious accommodations, it is said, have the power to “stigmatize and
demean” those who disagree with the religious claimant’s dissenting position
on these matters, even when such objections are “not stated explicitly.”147
The feeling of being “judged” by those who raise religious objections to
certain conduct, and the indignity of knowing that the state has countenanced
that judgment by permitting a religious accommodation, may themselves
be independent harms.148
Though NeJaime and Siegel do not discuss it, the ministerial exception
no less than the accommodation at issue in Hobby Lobby has the capacity
to “stigmatize and demean” third parties by injuring their dignity.149 Surely
Cheryl Perich, the fired teacher in Hosanna-Tabor, did feel “judged” and
“stigmatized” by the members of the religious institution that rescinded
her ministerial position, demanded her resignation, opined insultingly that
“she might pass out and scare the children” because of her diagnosed
narcolepsy, and finally terminated her employment after her period of
illness.150 One could go much further: heretics since time immemorial are
likely to have felt “judged” and “stigmatized” by their exclusion from the
orthodox fold. There the heretic stood; he could do no other; yet where
he stood was utterly deplored by the faithful.
Just as surely, religious objectors themselves feel “judged” and “stigmatized”
by a society that increasingly cannot or will not tolerate their moral views—
a society that finds such views unintelligible, retrograde, hateful, or all
three. They, too, must endure dignitary hurt. Yet these significant injuries
to human dignity are also not raised by NeJaime, Siegel, or virtually any
other scholar of antidiscrimination. They have been noted, however, by
Justice Kennedy: “In our constitutional tradition, freedom means that all
persons have the right to believe or strive to believe in a divine creator
and a divine law. For those who choose this course, free exercise is
essential in preserving their own dignity and in striving for a self-definition

146. See Andrew M. Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the
Purposes of Antidiscrimination Laws, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 627 (2015) (“Antidiscrimination
law has multiple purposes. Canonically, they are the amelioration of economic inequality,
the prevention of dignitary harm, and the stigmatization of discrimination.”).
147. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 121, at 2576–77.
148. Id. at 2577.
149. Indeed, there is an interesting question whether those who support these dignitary
theories might use them to limit the scope of the ministerial exception. To the extent that
the ministerial exception is grounded in the Establishment Clause, this could be considered
an example of the Clause cannibalizing itself. Thanks to Chip Lupu for elucidating this point.
150. See Brief for Respondent at 11, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 3380507.
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shaped by their religious precepts.”151 There are indeed harms—as it were,
“significant” and “material” harms—that cases concerning accommodation
for religious free exercise impose on people, however a court rules. Such
tragic losses are often the rule in conflicts implicating religious freedom.152
And yet many of these claims, including those connected with the ministerial
exception, have nothing to do with complicity. Nevertheless, NeJaime
and Siegel conclude that government must be cognizant of the “message”
that it is sending when it chooses to accommodate religion lest it “sanction”
harms to the individual dignity of those whom the law benefits.153
Here the authors’ claims, and the real threat they pose to religious
accommodation, ring true. The government’s vindication of third-party
dignitary harms has the potential to destroy religious accommodation.
The core function of religious accommodations, again, is to authorize limited,
but sometimes socially powerful and politically controversial, dissent from
the law’s moral messages. There is an important difference between dissent
from a law’s moral message and the denigration or vilification of the law’s
intended beneficiaries. “Hate the sin, love the sinner,” is the Christian
aphorism sometimes used to express this distinction,154 but it has proved
elusive and generally unpersuasive, or worse, to those whose dignity is
felt to be injured by claims for religious accommodations.155 A government
that assumes the power to confer dignity on individuals may also subject
itself to legal claims by individuals whose dignity has been harmed as the
deprivation of an entitlement. And there is reason to worry that the legal
conferral of dignity is expanding, as the Supreme Court increasingly
justifies its constitutional jurisprudence based on ever-thickening concepts of
human dignity.156 Lurking just beneath these dignitarian clashes are
151. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 121, at 2566, 2574.
152. I describe some of these at length in DEGIROLAMI, supra note 5. To be clear,
injuries to individual dignity, real though they may be, are not themselves bases for legal
(let alone constitutional) claims.
153. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 121, at 2586.
154. For further discussion, see STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 139–66 (2014).
155. See, e.g., id.; NeJaime and Siegel, supra note 121, at 2576–77 (“Gays and
lesbians perceive objections to same-sex marriage as status-based judgments.”).
156. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“The
history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the
equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of
their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its
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bottomless mysteries concerning the foundations of human nature—
religion or sex? Higher duty or worldly satisfaction?—that, one may
anxiously hope, neither the Supreme Court nor any other government
institution will ever assume the power to resolve.157
The government’s vindication of dignitarian harms has never by itself been
the basis for defeating a civil right, such as a right to religious accommodation,
let alone for invoking the Establishment Clause. Government recognition
and conferral of individual dignity is neither an independent constitutional
nor statutory right. But the confluence of various factors—the expanding
scope of the government’s authority in the lives of the citizenry, particularly
when it comes to the eradication of discrimination; the increasing numbers
of claims that religious accommodations impose harms on third parties,
including dignitarian harms, powerful enough to trump religious freedom;
and the general decline in broad social and political investment in the right
of religious freedom158—will conspire further to weaken the case for
religious accommodation in the years to come. “Claims for religious
exceptionalism,” as Professor John Inazu has put it, “are unlikely to
prevail against growing cultural resistance to the free exercise right.”159
Whether other First Amendment rights arguably facing less cultural
resistance than free exercise—rights of speech, association, or perhaps
even assembly—can fill the void remains to be seen.160 The ministerial

essence.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1993) (plurality
op.) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects “the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy”). Justice Kennedy has been particularly avid to constitutionalize dignitarian
protections, even in relatively unlikely places such as the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 709 (1999). Arguments from human dignity
have a comparatively long history in the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“By protecting even those
convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government
to respect the dignity of all persons.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”).
157. This is admittedly a hope that may lack foundation. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852
(“The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her
spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”).
158. John D. Inazu, More is More: Strengthening Free Exercise, Speech, and Association,
99 MINN. L. REV. 485, 508–10 (2014).
159. Id. at 531.
160. Inazu argues that they can. See id. at 531–34; see also JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S
REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012) (“[T]he more plausible historical
and jurisprudential interpretation locates the antecedents of constitutional association at
least as much in the right of assembly as in the right of speech.”) He may be right that,
for various socio-cultural reasons, there is currently greater social investment—and greater
legal potential—in these other rights than in free exercise. Still, the expansion of the
government’s interests in vindicating secular harms as a matter of right, and particularly
those harms involving sexual equality and autonomy, may with time encroach upon other
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exception established in Hosanna-Tabor and elaborated in a few cases
since will continue to illuminate its own small corner of free exercise
territory. But it can do nothing to reverse these developments.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps this is all too bleak. After all, Americans still cherish the
freedom to exercise religion, even as that freedom may clash with new
civil rights, such as the right to same-sex marriage, as well as the suite of
federal, state, and local antidiscrimination laws that speckle the country.
A recent Associated Press poll, for example, found both that a majority of
respondents supported a right to same-sex marriage and that a larger
majority believes that there should be strong exemption laws in place for
those who might have religious objections.161 Some laws protecting
religious freedom continue to pass162 and existing laws have not been
repealed. The Supreme Court has applied RFRA twice and RLUIPA once,
all three times siding with the religious claimant,163 and none of those
outcomes has been altered by Congress.
All of this is true, but none of it accounts for the considerable changes
afoot. The fact that religious accommodation in these and other contexts
has become so controversial and contested—the very fact that the desirability
of religious accommodation has become a question worth asking about in
popular polls, and that public opinion as well as the colossus of corporate
muscle against it is sizable and growing—is some evidence both of the
decline in popular commitment to the right of free exercise and the likelihood

established rights such as speech and association, just as they have on free exercise. On
this question, see Marc O. DeGirolami, The First Amendment and the Problem of Freedom
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
161. See Emily Swanson & Brady McCombs, AP-GfK Poll: Support of Gay
Marriage Comes with Caveats, AP GFK (Feb. 5, 2015), http://ap-gfkpoll.com/featured/
findings-from-our-latest-poll-13 [https://perma.cc/9FWR-5BB3].
162. See, for example, the recent “compromise” bill in Utah. Antidiscrimination and
Religious Freedom Amendments, S.B. 296, 61st Leg., 2015 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015),
http://le.utah.gov/~2015/bills/static/SB0296.html [https://perma.cc/7CBC-JMDH]. Utah
is highly unusual, however, with respect to the strength of religious concerns in the state’s
political life. And it remains to be seen how this compromise—and others like it—survives
the Supreme Court’s decision that the Constitution protects a fundamental right to samesex marriage. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015).
163. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2751, 2759, 2785 (2014); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente
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that the clashes between religious free exercise and the relentlessly expanding
body of antidiscrimination norms will increase. There is now enormous
resistance to passing new laws that protect religious freedom in much the
same way that RFRA does, and tangible rage against those that do pass.164
There are now calls to revoke the tax-exempt status of any religious
institution that does not embrace same-sex marriage.165 As the scope of
antidiscrimination law grows, possibly even to include the state’s vindication
of self-standing harms to individual dignity generated by religious
accommodation, Smith’s fervid warning about a world in which “each
conscience is a law unto itself” becomes more fitting as a description of
religious accommodation enchained than unleashed.166 For now, the
ministerial exception seems to have escaped these larger and far more
powerful trends. But Hosanna-Tabor is just one narrowly drafted decision,
and only a doctrinal toddler. Time will tell whether it will last.

164. In response to the explosive backlash generated by a recent religious freedom
bill in Indiana, the New York Times noted acidly that defenders of “so-called religious
freedom laws” are increasingly being successfully resisted by antidiscrimination
advocates. Michael Barbaro & Erik Eckhold, Indiana Law Denounced as Invitation to
Discriminate Against Gays, N.Y.TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/us/
politics/indiana-law-denounced-as-invitation-to-discriminate-against-gays.html [https://perma.
cc/KV5J-EQJ7].
165. Mark Oppenheimer, Now’s the Time To End Tax Exemptions for Religious
Institutions, TIME (June 28, 2015), http://time.com/3939143/nows-the-time-to-end-tax
exemptions-for-religious-institutions/ [https://perma.cc/AML9-8E8Y].
166. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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